University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts Papers

Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities

2006

Defamation and the art of backfire
Truda Gray
University of Wollongong, tcg02@uowmail.edu.au

Brian Martin
University of Wollongong, bmartin@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gray, Truda and Martin, Brian, "Defamation and the art of backfire" (2006). Faculty of Law, Humanities and
the Arts - Papers. 1106.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1106

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Defamation and the art of backfire
Abstract
Legal discussions of defamation commonly focus on defamation law, with relative neglect of struggles
that take place over defamation matters. To understand defamation struggles, we introduce backfire
theory: if something is perceived as unjust and information about it is communicated to relevant
audiences, it has the potential to backfire against those held responsible. Defamation suits have the
potential to backfire when they are seen as oppressive or contrary to free speech. There are several types
of actions by plaintiffs that can inhibit this backfire effect, including cover-up, devaluation of the
defendant, reinterpretation and intimidation. To illustrate the value of backfire analysis of defamation
struggles, we examine four Australian examples, involving author Avon Lovell, politician Robert Askin,
solicitor John Marsden and Aboriginal leader Geoff Clark, and the British example of McDonalds suit
against two activists. Participants in these struggles see the matters in terms of reputation and free
speech; backfire analysis allows an observer to put tactics used by participants in a coherent framework.

Keywords
defamation, art, backfire

Disciplines
Arts and Humanities | Law

Publication Details
Gray, T. & Martin, B. 2006, 'Defamation and the art of backfire', Deakin Law Review, vol. 11, no. 2, pp.
115-136.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1106

DEFAMATION AND THE ART OF BACKFIRE
TRUDA GRAY AND BRIAN MARTIN∗

[Legal discussions of defamation commonly focus on defamation law, with
relative neglect of struggles that take place over defamation matters. To
understand defamation struggles, we introduce backfire theory: if something
is perceived as unjust and information about it is communicated to relevant
audiences, it has the potential to backfire against those held responsible.
Defamation suits have the potential to backfire when they are seen as
oppressive or contrary to free speech. There are several types of actions by
plaintiffs that can inhibit this backfire effect, including cover-up, devaluation
of the defendant, reinterpretation and intimidation. To illustrate the value of
backfire analysis of defamation struggles, we examine four Australian
examples, involving author Avon Lovell, politician Robert Askin, solicitor
John Marsden and Aboriginal leader Geoff Clark, and the British example of
McDonald’s suit against two activists. Participants in these struggles see the
matters in terms of reputation and free speech; backfire analysis allows an
observer to put tactics used by participants in a coherent framework.]
I

INTRODUCTION

The standard perspective on defamation law is that it is an attempt to balance
the protection of two contrary values, reputation and free speech. On the one
hand, defamation actions serve to penalise those who make inaccurate and
malicious assaults on a person’s reputation and to provide recompense to
those whose reputations are unfairly tarnished. On the other, defamation laws
must not be so restrictive that they restrain free speech, including public
debate and investigative journalism that are essential for a well functioning
democracy. This perspective frames most legal writings about defamation,
which deal with facets of defamation law, the trajectories of particular cases,
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possibilities for law reform and the uses and abuses of defamation law for
protecting reputations and hindering free speech.
This focus on the law of defamation is useful, but has the effect of diverting
attention from a more practical matter: how struggles over reputation and over
free speech are carried out; in particular how to understand the dynamics of
such struggles. We use the word ‘struggle’ to signal that more is involved than
matters of reputation, free speech and the law. Defamation issues are matters
also of power, including the opportunity to publish one’s views to mass
audiences, the economic resources to pursue or defend legal actions, the social
power to mobilise support and wage campaigns, and the coercive power to
intimidate opponents.
We analyse defamation struggles using a different approach. We start with the
observation that a defamation action can rebound against the plaintiff when it
is perceived as unjust and information about it is widely communicated to
relevant audiences, causing outrage. Such an outcome can be termed a
backfire. Plaintiffs often take actions that inhibit outrage; defendants
sometimes act in ways that amplify it. We use the term ‘outrage’ to refer to
adverse reactions by individuals against something perceived as unjust or a
norm violation. Thus the term outrage is a surrogate for various emotions
including anger, disgust, disquiet and concern. We use the term ‘backfire’ to
refer to the process by which outrage is turned into expression or action
against whoever or whatever is perceived as responsible for the perceived
injustice.
In the next section, we discuss
other fields and then how it can
backfire framework to several
defamation suits. We conclude
approach to defamation matters.
II

backfire dynamics, first outlining its use in
be applied to defamation. We next apply the
public cases involving actual or potential
with comments on the implications of this

THE DYNAMICS OF BACKFIRE

In a confrontation between protestors and heavily armed police, it might seem
that the police inevitably have an overwhelming advantage in terms of
imposing their will. In many situations this is true, but sometimes the actions
of the police can rebound against them. If the protestors are seen to be
peaceful and non-threatening, and the actions of the police excessive, this can
mobilise greater support for the protestors, cause outrage among previously
neutral observers and even cause concern among some of the police.
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A number of famous historical cases follow this pattern. In 1930, as part of
the Indian independence struggle, Gandhi led what has been called the salt
satyagraha, beginning with a march to the sea to produce salt in defiance of
the British salt monopoly. During raids following the march, activists came
forward and, without resisting, suffered brutal beatings by the police. This
dramatic confrontation was reported by a US journalist, causing outrage
worldwide and greatly weakening the credibility of British rule.1
In 1960 in South Africa, during nationwide protests against the government’s
pass laws, white police opened fire on the crowd in the town of Sharpeville,
killing perhaps a hundred black Africans. The story, accompanied by photos
taken by visiting journalists, produced headlines internationally and triggered
a great increase in opposition to apartheid.2
In 1991 in Dili, the capital of East Timor, then occupied by Indonesia, troops
opened fire on protestors at a funeral. The atrocity was witnessed by several
western journalists and captured on videotape, which was later broadcast
internationally. The Dili massacre led to a massive increase in international
support for the East Timor independence movement.3
Nonviolence researcher Gene Sharp, who studied hundreds of campaigns,
found this sort of reaction to attacks on nonviolent protesters to be such a
regular occurrence that he included it as one of the stages in what he called
‘the dynamics of nonviolent action’. Sharp called this effect ‘political jiujitsu’ by analogy with the sport of jiu-jitsu in which the force of the opponent
is used against them.4 The concept of backfire is a generalisation of political
jiu-jitsu beyond the field of nonviolent action.
In each of the cases mentioned, there appear to be two preconditions: a
perceived injustice, namely brutal force against peaceful protestors, and
communication to significant third party audiences. Although some attacks on
nonviolent protestors rebound against the attackers, most do not. For example,
there were many earlier atrocities in East Timor that attracted little attention.
What actions by attackers are likely to inhibit outrage? By examining a range

1

Thomas Weber, On the Salt March (1997).
Philip Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and its Massacre (2001).
3
Arnold S Kohen, From the Place of the Dead: The Epic Struggles of Bishop Belo of
East Timor (1999).
4
Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (1973) 657.
2
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of cases, we can observe several types of methods that reduce or eliminate
outrage. This approach to the issue is a form of grounded theory.5
The main methods used that inhibit outrage can be classified into five
categories:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Cover-up;
Devaluation of the target;
Reinterpretation of what happened;
The use of official procedures to give an appearance of justice;
Intimidation and bribery.

For example in the Sharpeville massacre,6 (1) police removed evidence that
anti-personnel ‘dumdum’ bullets had been used, including destroying
evidence of police stocks and removing bodies showing the characteristic
damage from these bullets; (2) police and most of the white population in
South Africa considered blacks to be inferior; (3) police claimed the crowd
was menacing, whereas other observers had noted a playful mood; (4) the
government immediately set up an official inquiry into the massacre, designed
to be sympathetic to the government line but not too obviously subservient;
(5) police, just after the massacre, arrested and threatened local activists, so
few were willing to testify to the official inquiry, while the government
declared a state of emergency. These actions dampened outrage from within
both the black and the white South African communities, but were unable to
prevent a huge international reaction to the massacre. This was principally
because information about the events got out of the country and the
international audience was not strongly influenced by the methods of
devaluation, reinterpretation, legitimation by official inquiry, and
intimidation.
Most or all of these five methods of inhibiting outrage are found not only in
violent attacks against peaceful protestors but also in a wide range of other
issues, including censorship,7 whistleblowing,8 dismissal of academics,9
police beatings,10 torture,11 and invasion of other countries such as Iraq.12

5

Barney G Glaser and Anselm L Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory:
Strategies for Qualitative Research (1967).
6
Frankel, above n 2.
7
Sue Curry Jansen and Brian Martin, ‘Making Censorship Backfire’ (July 2003) 7
Counterpoise 5; Sue Curry Jansen and Brian Martin, ‘Exposing and Opposing
Censorship: Backfire Dynamics in Freedom-of-speech Struggles’ (2004) 10 Pacific
Journalism Review 29.
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The common characteristic in these cases is a perceived injustice or a
violation of a social norm. Violent attacks on peaceful protestors are widely
seen as unjust; likewise, censorship is a violation of freedom of expression, a
widely valued norm (at least in some societies), and a military attack on a
non-threatening opponent is a violation of norms for international behaviour.
If perpetrators may employ these five major methods for inhibiting outrage,
then targets have available corresponding avenues for countering the
inhibition, for example by (1) exposing the action; (2) demonstrating the value
of the target; (3) giving their own interpretation of events; (4) avoiding or
discrediting official channels that give only an illusion of justice; (5) resisting
and exposing intimidation and bribery.
Note that we are primarily concerned with perceived injustices and norm
violations by powerful groups against those less powerful. Powerful groups
have the capacity to inhibit outrage, at least in some cases. The opposite
situation, in which a relatively powerless individual attacks a powerful group,
almost inevitably backfires. For example, a man who randomly opens fire on
his bosses seldom receives much sympathy and is unlikely to be able to draw
on any of the five methods of inhibiting outrage.
This analysis, with a few modifications, can readily be applied to defamation.
Suing for defamation can backfire if it is seen as oppressive or unjust - in
particular as a threat to free speech - and if information about it is
communicated to significant audiences. Consider in this regard the five main
methods of inhibition:

8

Brian Martin with Will Rifkin, ‘The Dynamics of Employee Dissent:
Whistleblowers and Organisational Jiu-jitsu’ (2004) 4 Public Organisation Review
221.
9
Brian Martin, ‘The Richardson Dismissal as an Academic Boomerang’ in Kenneth
Westhues (ed), Workplace Mobbing in Academe: Reports from Twenty Universities
(2004) 317; Brian Martin, ‘Boomerangs of Academic Freedom’ (June 2005) 6.2
Workplace: A Journal for Academic Labor, available at
http://www.cust.educ.ubc.ca/workplace/issue6p2/steele.htm.
10
Brian Martin, ‘The Beating of Rodney King: The Dynamics of Backfire’ (2005) 13
Critical Criminology 307.
11
Brian Martin and Steve Wright, ‘Countershock: Mobilising Resistance to
Electroshock Weapons’ (2003) 19 Medicine, Conflict and Survival 205.
12
Brian Martin, ‘Iraq Attack Backfire’ (17 April 2004) 39 Economic and Political
Weekly 1577.
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(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)

(6)

Cover-up. Plaintiffs seldom publicise their actions; in offering a
settlement, they often require defendants to sign a silencing clause.
Defence lawyers commonly advise against seeking publicity, due to
the risk of alienating the judge or of this being seen as evidence of
malice.
Devaluation of the target. Defamation law encourages denigration of
the defendant to overcome claims made by the defence such as
reasonableness and absence of malice.13
Reinterpretation. Plaintiffs describe their purpose as defence of
reputation, not suppression of free expression.
Official channels. Plaintiffs use the law as a means of attack. The
complexity and slowness of defamation law make it difficult to
mobilise outrage against such attacks.
Intimidation and bribery. Plaintiffs’ threats and legal actions often
intimidate defendants, while offers of settlement can operate like
bribes.

In the analysis of defamation actions using the backfire model, there is one
distinct difference from other applications. In the Sharpeville massacre and
other such attacks, formal inquiries are commonly set up to defuse outrage by
giving the appearance of justice. But in the case of defamation actions, official
channels — namely the legal system — constitute the very means by which
the attack is launched. The existence of defamation law gives, in advance, a
degree of legitimacy to a certain category of threat to free expression.
III

CASE STUDIES

We now apply backfire analysis to several cases. The first case, Lovell,
involved numerous defamation actions to prevent publication. The second,
Askin, involved an implicit threat to sue media. The third, Marsden, involved
a solicitor suing a television station. The fourth, Clark, involved a prominent
person who, defamed in the media, decided not to sue. Finally, we describe
the McLibel case, the most prominent case of backfire from a defamation
action. There are other cases that can be readily analysed using the backfire
model.14
13

We thank Greg Ogle (personal communication, 10 November 2004) for this point.
David Irving’s suit to clear his reputation of the charge of being a Holocaust
revisionist is a good example. See Richard J. Evans, Lying about Hitler: History,
Holocaust and the David Irving Trial (2001). One of the most significant cases in
Australia in recent years involved developers suing a wide range of critics of a plan to
build a bridge to Hindmarsh Island, South Australia. We leave it to the reader to apply
backfire analysis to this case. See Debra Jopson, ‘A Bridge Writ Large’, Sydney
14
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We have used cases from Australian and British jurisdictions where
defamation law is widely seen as friendly to plaintiffs and hostile to free
speech.15 However, the backfire framework should apply anywhere
defamation actions can potentially be perceived as oppressive. SLAPPs
(Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation), which are commonplace in
the US, appear to fit the backfire model quite well.16 Similarly, the backfire
model can be used to analyse legal actions, other than defamation, that are
perceived as oppressive, such as the many types of legal action classified as
SLAPPs.
It is worth emphasising that our analysis looks only at actions and their
effects, not at motivations of the participants. For example, in looking at the
first method of inhibition, cover-up, we examine ways in which actions taken
by participants on one or both sides have the effect of limiting wider
awareness of defamation actions and their consequences; this examination
does not make assumptions about the motivations of the participants to cover
up or reveal the activities. The very term ‘cover-up’ refers to cover-up as a
consequence, not as an intention. This agnosticism about motivations is a
general feature of backfire analysis, in which the focus is on the effects of
actions. This is compatible with the view that everyone has the best of
intentions.17
Morning Herald (Sydney), 2 March 1999, 14; ABC Radio National, ‘Hindmarsh
Island Defamation’, The National Interest, 14 December 2003,
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/natint/stories/s1009598.htm> at 22 June 2006; Is This
Website Defamatory? (2004) Kumarangk Legal Defence Fund
<http://green.net.au/hindmarsh/defamation.htm> at 22 June 2006; Tricky Legal
Business: The Impact of Legal Processes on the Campaign Against the Hindmarsh
Island Bridge (24 October 1998) Kumarangk Legal Defence Fund
<http://green.net.au/hindmarsh/tricky.htm> at 22 June 2006.
15
On defamation matters in Australia, see Michael Newcity, ‘The Sociology of
Defamation in Australia and the United States’ (1991) 26 Texas International Law
Journal 1; Robert Pullan, Guilty Secrets: Free Speech and Defamation in Australia
(1994); Brian Walters, Slapping on the Writs: Defamation, Developers and
Community Activism (2003). On defamation matters in Britain, see Eric Barendt,
Laurence Lustgarten, Kenneth Norrie and Hugh Stephenson, Libel and the Media:
The Chilling Effect (1997); Fiona J L Donson, Legal Intimidation: A SLAPP in the
Face of Democracy (2000); David Hooper, Reputations under Fire: Winners and
Losers in the Libel Business (2000).
16
George Pring and Penelope Canan, SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out (1996).
See also Seth Goodchild, ‘Media Counteractions: Restoring the Balance to Modern
Libel Law’ (1986) 75 Georgetown Law Journal 315.
17
Roy F Baumeister, Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty (1997) argues that
usual perceptions of evildoers as malevolent or uncaring are wrong, and that instead
they see themselves as victims or as justified in their actions.
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A

Avon Lovell and The Mickelberg Stitch

In 1982, in a spectacular case in Western Australia, three brothers — Ray,
Peter and Brian Mickelberg — were sentenced to prison for swindling gold
from the Perth Mint. In 1985, journalist Avon Lovell published a book
entitled The Mickelberg Stitch,18 in which he argued that the prosecution case
against the Mickelbergs was based on questionable evidence. In other words,
Lovell alleged the police had framed the brothers. With a big print run of
20,000, The Mickelberg Stitch sold rapidly in Perth until police threatened to
sue the book’s distributor and any bookseller or other business offering it for
sale. The Police Union introduced a $2 per week levy on its 5000 members to
fund 40 legal actions against Lovell, the distributor and retailers. The
defamation threats and actions effectively suppressed any general availability
of the book. None of the suits against Lovell reached trial in over a decade;
they remained active despite his repeated attempts to strike them out for lack
of prosecution.
Eventually all suits were dropped in a settlement that was financially generous
for Lovell and made no restrictions on distribution of the book. Lovell later
convinced a retired detective, Tony Lewandowski, to publicly admit his role
in framing the Mickelbergs by fabricating confessions. The convictions of the
three brothers were quashed on appeal in 2004.19
Cover-up is central to this example. The police suits served to suppress
availability of and publicity about Lovell’s book and also discouraged media
attention to the cover-up process. According to Lovell (personal
communication, 13 November 2004), he was devalued through the
presumption of the courts that the police were right and he was wrong. In
addition, he says police spread rumours to journalists that he was not a real
journalist, was involved in compromising sexual affairs and so forth. The suits
reinterpreted the issue from a debate about an alleged police frame-up to a
legal matter. The official channels of the legal system were the method of
attack: Lovell was tied up by the suits (including countersuits, there were
eventually 82 actions), making over 1000 court appearances in a decade. The
actions served as a method of intimidating any author, publisher or bookseller
that might have wanted to pursue the story. According to Lovell, other
methods of intimidation were used against him, including loosening wheel

18

Avon Lovell, The Mickelberg Stitch (1985). See also Avon Lovell, Split Image:
International Mystery of the Mickelberg Affair (1990)
19
Andrea Mayes and David King, ‘Court Quashes Brothers’ Convictions for 1982
Perth Mint Swindle’, The Weekend Australian (Sydney), 3-4 July 2004, 8.
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bolts on his car, which could have led to a serious accident. Thus all the
methods of inhibiting outrage were present in this case.
Lovell’s many court appearances did little to amplify outrage. On the other
hand, by convincing Lewandowski to admit to a police frame-up, Lovell was
dramatically successful in reopening public discussion of the case. Lovell’s
most effective counter to the defamation suits therefore was publicity, not
court appearances.
B

Robert Askin

Robert Askin was premier of New South Wales from 1965 to 1975. Among
journalists and others, he was widely known to be involved in criminal
activities, but the media were unwilling to publish anything about this due to
Australia’s restrictive defamation laws. Shortly after Askin died in 1981, The
National Times — a weekly newspaper that featured much investigative
journalism — published a story by journalist David Hickie titled ‘Askin:
Friend to Organised Crime’. The opening paragraphs of this article give ample
testimony to the power of defamation law to inhibit free speech:
Sir Robert Askin was an underestimated man. The mark he left on this country
was considerable — and has never publicly been discussed. While Sir Robert
Askin was in power, organised crime became institutionalised on a large scale
in New South Wales for the first time. Sydney became, and has remained, the
crime capital of Australia. Askin was central to this. His links with three major
crime figures [Perce] Galea, close friend Joe Taylor and another, allowed the
transformation of Sydney’s baccarat clubs into fully-fledged casinos.
Askin’s links with corrupt police allowed these casinos and SP [starting price]
betting to flourish. The corrupt police included commissioners Allan and
Hanson.
According to a reliable source very high in the old Galea empire, Askin and
Hanson were paid approximately $100,000 each in bribes a year from the end
of the Sydney gang wars in 1967-68 until Askin’s retirement. The source is
impeccable. This information has not been available for The National Times to
use until Askin’s death…
Only now that Askin is dead can the recent history of NSW be explored
publicly. It is not a time for holding back, despite the distress these revelations
may cause Askin’s colleagues and family.
Such are the laws of defamation in this country, that only a royal commission
or parliamentary debate could fully protect public discussion about the Askin
years while the man lived. Recent commissions into organised crime have
never dealt publicly with Askin’s role.20
20

David Hickie, ‘Askin: Friend to Organised Crime’ The National Times (Sydney),
13-19 September 1981, 1.
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The article went on to give details about criminal operations in New South
Wales and Askin’s role in them.21 Subsequently, there was a major debate in
the Sydney Morning Herald about Askin’s personal involvement, such as
whether he had regularly received bundles of cash in brown paper bags, but
there seemed no disagreement about the expansion of criminal activity during
his term as premier. This case clearly shows how defamation law can inhibit
open discussion of matters of great public import.
This case reveals several methods by which outrage over the injustice of this
process was inhibited. The likelihood that Askin would sue for defamation
served to intimidate the media. Neither Askin nor the media discussed this
likelihood, so the role of defamation law was covered up, as were Askin’s
activities. After Askin’s death, The National Times explicitly linked
defamation law and cover-up; the alternative interpretation, built into the law
itself, is that the key issue was protection of Askin’s reputation. Defamation
law was the official channel by which free speech was inhibited. As noted in
the article, ways around the law, such as comment in parliament protected by
parliamentary privilege, were not used. Askin, as leader of the government,
would have had formidable power to attack parliamentary critics. The only
technique of inhibiting outrage not obviously involved was devaluation; it was
less relevant because cover-up was so effective.
It is worth noting that in this case, defamation law was only one of the means
for covering up discussion of criminal activity. When organised crime and
corrupt police are involved, anyone who speaks out can be in jeopardy, as
illustrated in the following extract from Hickie’s article:
In April 1967 Askin was handed a statutory declaration by a Mr B. Ng
containing allegations of police complicity with members of organised crime
syndicates in Sydney’s Chinatown involved in unlicensed gambling, smuggling
of narcotics and counterfeit money.
The Ng controversy lasted for two years. Ng and his lawyer were harassed and
even threatened with death. At last Askin refused an inquiry into Chinatown —
on the basis of a report from [Police] Commissioner Allan.
Hatton [John Hatton, independent member of state parliament] subsequently
told parliament that independent opinions obtained from Ken Marks QC … and
two other leading interstate counsel had concluded that Allan’s report was a
‘carefully compiled and intelligent whitewash that should be categorised as
dishonest and a derogation of duty to the public to ventilate serious matters.’22
21

Hickie later explored Askin’s criminal connections in more depth in David Hickie,
The Prince and the Premier: The Story of Perce Galea, Bob Askin and the Others
Who Gave Organised Crime its Start in Australia (1985).
22
Hickie, above n 20, 8.
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The Ng episode illustrates the use of both intimidation and official
channels to inhibit outrage.
C

John Marsden

John Marsden was one of a group of prominent Sydney figures rumoured to
be engaged in paedophilia. Channel Seven, one of the principal Australian
television networks, aired specific allegations against Marsden in two
programmes in 1995 and 1996.23 Marsden was a well known and, in some
eyes, an infamous character on the Sydney scene. As a solicitor his name had
been associated with many high-profile court cases. He was a past president
of the New South Wales Law Society and had been a member of the Police
Board. He moved amongst a powerful elite as an open homosexual.
After the Channel Seven broadcasts, Marsden sued for defamation, denying
the allegations and claiming he would clear his reputation in court. However,
what he thought would be a quick victory turned into a public saga, expanding
into Australia’s longest ever defamation case.24
The entire process, including initial injunctions against Channel Seven, the
defamation trial and various appeals, lasted over six years. Channel Seven and
other media publicised the court proceedings and the evidence from
witnesses, keeping the details of the allegations against Marsden in the public
eye.
By the time the court finally found against Channel Seven and awarded
Marsden damages and costs, the damage had been amplified beyond

23

The programmes were Today Tonight, 13 March 1995, and Witness, 7 May 1996.
See Kate McClymont, ‘Marsden’s Bitter-sweet Victory: ‘Forever Tainted’’ (28 June
2001) Sydney Morning Herald 1; ABC Radio, ‘Defamation Case Has Ruined my Life
and Reputation: Marsden’, 7.30 Report, 20 July 2000,
<http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/stories/s154345.htm> at 22 June 2006.
24
Marsden commenced action against Channel Seven (Amalgamated Television
Services) on 14 March 1995, when he sought to restrain it from broadcasting a second
programme (Witness, actually broadcast in 1996). The main defamation action, which
began in February 1999, concerned allegations made in a segment of the 13 March
1995 Today Tonight broadcast. See John Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services
Pty Ltd S.96/004 (Unreported, High Court of Australia, Gummow J, 2 & 3 May
1996). The final judgement was handed down in June 2001: Marsden v Amalgamated
Television Services Pty Ltd 510 (Unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, Levine J,
2001).
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salvation.25 Technically Marsden had won the case but both his reputation and
his health had been severely damaged, and along the way he was financially
stretched.26 His reputation was not restored by the victory, which has been
described as ‘pyrrhic.’27

We now examine the five methods of inhibiting outrage and the
corresponding methods of amplifying outrage in relation to this case.
Cover-up
Usually media organisations do not publicise defamation actions against
themselves. In this case Seven took the opposite tack. It led with the
allegations against Marsden and continued to publicise the trial and details of
the unfolding evidence. Other media, protected by the qualified privilege of
being able to report court proceedings and enticed by the controversial public
persona of Marsden, followed suit. New witnesses and police evidence were
brought forward throughout the trial. In the course of this, myriad details of
Marsden’s life and personal proclivities came under the microscope.
By the end of the trial the initial allegations and the unfolding details of
Marsden’s life were being broadcast and discussed far beyond the original,
mainly Sydney-based, audience for the initial programs aired by Channel
Seven. Marsden observed that he ‘never thought it would be like this. I
thought it would be over in six weeks.’28
Devaluation of the target
While Channel Seven came under some scrutiny and criticism for its
journalistic practices and its motives for publicising the allegations against
Marsden, it was Marsden himself who came under the greatest scrutiny and
criticism.
Marsden was continually devalued by the unfolding evidence and the
testimony of witnesses against him and from his own admissions, seen as
damning in some people’s eyes. He admitted he was promiscuous and used

25

McClymont, above n 23.
John Marsden, I Am What I Am: My Life and Curious Times (2004) 284, 343, 359.
27
Channel Nine Television, ‘A Matter of Honour: John Marsden’, Sixty Minutes, 1
July 2001,
<http://sixtyminutes.ninemsn.com.au/sixtyminutes/stories/2001_07_01/story_360.asp
> at 22 June 2006.
28
ABC Radio, above n 23.
26

2006

Defamation and the Art of Backfire 127

drugs. He denied allegations of paedophilia but acknowledged his habit of
taking casual sexual partners home and not, as he put it, checking their birth
certificates.
Further, during the course of the trial Marsden approached some of the
witnesses. The media presented this as an improper way of behaving.
Marsden argued in his own defence that ‘I was entitled. There’s no fence
around a witness … I’m a lawyer and I acted properly and with proper
consideration of the legal requirements.’29 The overall effect of this was to
devalue the plaintiff rather than the defendant.
Reinterpretation
Marsden tried to reframe the public and political issues of paedophilia into the
private and legal issues of protection of reputation. But in this case the
reframing failed. This was no doubt due to Marsden’s own high profile and
the public’s salacious interest in details of sexual behaviour that were the
subject of the trial, combined with Channel Seven’s willingness to use its
power as a major media organisation to promote its perspective.
Official Channels
Commissions of inquiry and court cases often work to turn contentious public
political issues into closed private proceedings, thereby defusing the political
heat. The Marsden trial had the opposite effect. The legal proceedings made
what was already sensational even more so by fuelling it with a welter of
unfolding details about Marsden’s life and practices.
Intimidation
Far from intimidating Channel Seven, the defamation proceedings gave it
further opportunity to air the allegations and to publicise material about
Marsden. There was great public interest in the case and it made good copy.
Channel Seven had a large team of lawyers and resources to call on for
handling such legal challenges.
In July 2000, before the end of the legal process, Marsden stated: ‘[i]t’s
probably totally ruined my life and my health. It’s certainly ruined me
financially. I’ve lost a lot of friends. I live on medication. I — I go through
horrendous dreams.’30 Given this assessment, one might conclude it was
Marsden who was more intimidated by the whole process.
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In summary, Marsden’s use of defamation proceedings to silence those who
were criticising him seriously backfired. In this regard, journalist Kate
McClymont commented that ‘in the cold light of day, the court case — to
seek compensation for the damage to his reputation — was far more
damaging and personally humiliating than either of Channel Seven’s two
programs ever were.’31 Although he won legally, his reputation was further
damaged. A satirical publication remarked that Marsden should now sue
himself for defamation.32 Marsden in his autobiography stated that he ‘wanted
to highlight the failures of the legal system to protect people who have been
subject to outrageous defamation.’33
Marsden died of cancer in May 2006. Media reports included praise and some
fierce criticism, including new revelations about sex with underage males.34
Marsden’s defamation action had created sufficient interest in his behaviour,
especially in the media, that his reputation came under further attack. This can
be regarded as an extension of the backfire from his defamation case.
D

Geoff Clark

Geoff Clark, an Aboriginal activist, was head of the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), the highest level Aboriginal peak body
in Australia. In 2001, the Melbourne newspaper The Age, one of Australia’s
most prestigious dailies, published a front-page article titled ‘Geoff Clark:
Power and Rape’35 alleging that in the 1970s and 1980s Clark had raped four
women.
Clark denied the allegations, claiming The Age ‘have (sic) surpassed the
bounds of reporting and have constituted themselves (sic) as judge, jury and

31

Kate McClymont, ‘Got the Money, Lost the Name: How John Marsden Won a
Court Case and Destroyed his own Reputation’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 28
June 2001, 13.
32
‘Marsden Now to Sue Himself: ‘Court Action Sullied My Reputation’’, (2001) 42
The Chaser.
33
Marsden, above n 26, 1.
34
Among the critical commentaries are Paul Sheehan, ‘Case for the Damnation of
Marsden’ Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 22 May 2006, 11; Ron Hicks, ‘Painful
Memories Hard to Erase’ Weekend Australian, 17 June 2006, 23.
35
Andrew Rule, ‘Geoff Clark: Power and Rape’ The Age (Melbourne), 14 June 2001,
1.

Defamation and the Art of Backfire 129

2006

executioner.’36 In response to accusations that it was conducting a ‘trial by
media,’ The Age justified its publication of the story by claiming the public
had a right to know, the allegations were true and Clarke had never been
brought to trial. The story engendered a lot of public discussion, specifically
from legal groups, women’s groups, media organisations, journalists and
Aboriginal groups. The combination of the role of the law, the media, race,
sexual politics and crime was explosive.
Clark accused the media, particularly the Fairfax company, the owner of The
Age, of carrying out a campaign of vilification against him and other leaders
of Aboriginal organisations in order to discredit and destroy Aboriginal
organisations such as ATSIC and to reduce his personal political position.
Michael Gawenda, the editor of The Age, challenged Clark to use defamation
proceedings to clear his name and called on the Prime Minister to intervene
and for Clark to stand down from his position at the head of ATSIC.
Clark did not sue for defamation. He claimed the cost was prohibitive and the
delay in achieving any outcome would be too great.37 It is reasonable to
surmise that a defamation suit would have played into the hands of his
accusers, giving them an opportunity to further publicise the claims and to
increase sales. In other words, there was a high probability that a defamation
action would have backfired. By not suing, Clark may well have avoided a
saga like that endured by Marsden.
E

McLibel

The McLibel case is the most famous example of defamation action
backfiring on the initiator.38 McLibel refers to the case of McDonald’s versus
two activists, Helen Steel and Dave Morris. In the late 1980s, Steel and
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Morris and other members of the anarchist group London Greenpeace39
produced and distributed a leaflet outside McDonald’s restaurants called
‘What’s Wrong With McDonald’s: Everything They Don’t Want You to
Know.’40 The leaflet covered a number of topics including nutrition, labour
practices, cruelty to animals and environmental damage. McDonald’s sued the
activists for defamation, claiming numerous statements in the leaflet were
false.41
McDonald’s was renowned for using defamation actions to silence critics; the
case against London Greenpeace was but one of its many actions and threats
over the years.42 Usually McDonald’s had been successful in damping down
critical comment but this case did not go to plan. Steel and Morris decided to
stand their ground and fight the action. With only occasional legal advice
from a pro bono lawyer, they did so on their own and with very limited
resources. The public interest in McDonald’s and in the issues raised by the
trial, and particularly in the spectacle of the two individuals standing before
the onslaught of the financial and legal power of such a powerful corporation,
increased public attention.
Cover-up
McDonald’s tried to shut down the activists’ criticisms both by instituting the
defamation proceedings and in subsequent settlement offers. In media
statements after the trial began, McDonald’s said it had started the legal action
to stop the publication of the leaflet and its resultant publicity.43 Two months
into the trial, McDonald’s contacted the defendants Steel and Morris to try to
get them to pull out and agree to a settlement. McDonald’s offered to pay ‘a
substantial sum’ to a mutually agreed third party on the condition that Steel
and Morris sign a promise to never again make any public criticism of
McDonald’s. This offer was rejected by Steel and Morris and rejected again a
year later when McDonald’s repeated the offer.44 As the defendants pointed
out, ‘[t]he whole reason we are fighting the case was to defend our right to
criticise them and other multinationals, so we are hardly going to agree to gag
ourselves.’45
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If McDonald’s aim was to silence criticism, its actions had the effect of
galvanising it. Massive publicity about the case was generated. A very
effective support group was established to help with the court case and to
publicise the issues involved. This was achieved with minimal resources but
with remarkable organisation. A website, McSpotlight, was set up to give
people around the world access to details of the trial as it proceeded and
information about the issues raised.46 The offending leaflet was translated into
27 languages and was distributed in the millions by bands of people who
signed up to continue what McDonald’s was trying to prevent.
In the face of the rising publicity, McDonald’s, in desperation, tried to avoid
media exposure when it could, refusing to speak to some programs and to
particular journalists.47
McDonald’s efforts at cover-up extended to the court proceedings. The
corporation made every effort to keep documents and evidence out of the trial,
The company had evidence presented by Steel and Morris struck out on
various technical legal grounds, only to have it reinstated when Steel and
Morris won their appeal against this.48 Morris commented that he and Steel
had ‘a constant battle to get McDonald’s to hand over all the relevant
documents in their possession — as they should have done before the case
began, but were still being forced to do right up to the end.’49 As it turned out,
the defendants were able to use the court processes to obtain and make public
many documents damaging to McDonald’s and to cross-examine expert
witnesses to the same effect.
Devaluation of the target
A defamation action carries with it the implication that the defendant has done
something illegal, even reprehensible. McDonald’s attempted to portray the
activists in this way and to present their criticism as unjustified. McDonald’s
published its own leaflet attacking the criticisms made in the London
Greenpeace leaflet and calling the defendants Steel and Morris liars. However
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this representation did not stand up to public scrutiny. The corporation itself
was devalued for its bullying tactics which were apparent to the public;
furthermore, the inequality in financial and legal resources offended many
people’s sense of fair play. The importance of free speech in a democracy was
at issue and the corporation appeared to be attempting to suppress a public
right. The public’s image of McDonald’s was lowered and that of the
defendants was enhanced.
Reinterpretation
McDonald’s, through its legal action, attempted to recast the issue as one
protection of reputation. The defendants were far more successful in
portraying the issue as one of free speech versus censorship. Helen Steel, in
her submission to the court stated that: ‘We feel there is one word that can
sum up what this case is about, and that is censorship. McDonald’s is using
the libel laws of this country to censor and silence their critics.’50
Official Channels
The use of official channels reverberated against McDonald’s. Its reputation,
which was technically being protected in court, was impugned for the very act
of initiating the defamation action. The corporation’s use of this channel to
attack was obvious to the public. The attempt to turn a public issue into a legal
matter was countered by the defendants and their support group who were
able to continually keep the issues before the public by publicising the trial
proceedings.
Intimidation
Over the years McDonald’s had issued so many threats and legal actions
against critics that it had created a general fear of the repercussions of
criticising the corporation.51 The intimidating prospect of defending
themselves against such a corporation prompted three of the initial five
activists who were sued in the McLibel case to withdraw and apologise to
McDonald’s. Helen Steel commented that, ‘It just really stuck in the throat to
apologise to McDonald’s. I thought it was them that should have been
apologising to us — well not us specifically, but to society for the damage
they do to society and the environment.’52
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When McDonald’s published and distributed its own leaflet against the
defendants, Steel and Morris counter-sued the corporation for defamation.
The two defendants stood against the team of corporate lawyers and the
resources of McDonald’s. Legal commentator Marcel Berlins observed that he
‘cannot think of a case in which the legal cards have been so spectacularly
stacked against one party.’53
In legal terms, the original Mclibel case resulted in a mixed outcome for both
sides. Five of the original claims were considered proven against
McDonald’s54 and eight were considered unproven. McDonald’s was by this
time trying to minimise the publicity surrounding the trial and did not pursue
damages and dropped its claim for costs.55
Although the corporation was awarded damages and technically won on a
number of legal points, the case was as a public relations disaster. Its action
against the two activists was viewed by many observers as unfair. The public
interest in the trial and the issues raised were far reaching. What McDonald’s
hoped would be a private legal knock down of the two defendants turned into
what Morris described as a ‘public issue fought and won in the court of public
opinion and on the street.’56 In summary, the legal action by McDonald’s
backfired spectacularly.
As a final turn, Steel and Morris took the British government to the European
Court of Human Rights, claiming their freedom of speech had been curtailed
because of Britain’s defamation laws. In February 2005 the court upheld their
claims, ruling that the two activists should have been given legal aid.
IV

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The backfire framework, developed to analyse the dynamics of injustice in a
range of areas, can be extended to the study of defamation threats and suits.
There are two key requirements for an action to backfire on its originators: it
must be perceived as unjust or excessive, and it must be communicated to
significant audiences. The McLibel case is the best example of defamation
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action backfire: the high-powered suit by McDonald’s was seen as
disproportionate to the actions of the two indigent defendants, and a major
anti-McDonald’s campaign grew up around the case, symbolised by the
McSpotlight website.
However, most actions do not backfire, even when they have the potential to
do so. Perpetrators can take a number of types of actions that inhibit outrage:
cover-up, devaluation of the target, reinterpretation of the action, use of
official channels, and intimidation and bribery. These types of actions are
found in a wide variety of situations, including police beatings and wars. They
are also found in many defamation actions. Cover-up occurs when the
plaintiff or the defendant, or both, keep the action out of the public eye.
Sometimes those threatened with defamation actions do not publicise them
because it is easier to acquiesce than to organise publicity. For example, when
West Australian police threatened bookshops selling Avon Lovell’s book The
Mickelberg Stitch, it is understandable that they might just acquiesce: their
main business was selling books, not opposing censorship.
Devaluation of the target is implicit in the charge of defamation, because the
defendant is alleged to be engaged in illegal activity. Inside the court, efforts
to demonstrate the defendant’s malice can cause devaluation. Additional
devaluation often occurs behind the scenes through circulation of rumours. In
cases that backfire, it is the reputation of the plaintiff that suffers, as in the
McLibel case and also John Marsden’s disastrous suit against Channel Seven.
Reinterpretation of the action is built into the charge of defamation: the
defendant frequently claims to have been exercising free speech; the suit
redefines the action as an attack on reputation.
Defamation actions use the legal system as a means of attack. Given that laws
and courts are widely perceived as providing justice, this provides a powerful
means of legitimating the attack and inhibiting outrage.
Finally, defamation actions are potent means of intimidation. Indeed, merely
the threat of a defamation action often operates to inhibit people from
speaking out. Intimidation thus links closely with cover-up. Bribery also plays
a role: a settlement often reduces a defendant’s incentive to act against the
injustice of a defamation suit, and the silencing clauses in many settlements
enforce cover-up.
Importantly, two of the key means of inhibiting outrage are inherent in
defamation law: the interpretation that the issue is one of reputation and the
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fact that defamation law has the status of law, with all the advantages of
official credibility that attach to that. It is also significant that defamation
suits, and sometimes just threats, intimidate many people.
If there are five methods of inhibiting outrage, then by turning each one on its
head we arrive at five methods of countering inhibition: publicise the action,
validate the worth of the target, interpret the action as a violation of free
speech, discredit the courts as a means of obtaining justice (at least in relation
to free speech and reputation), and refuse to be intimidated or bribed. As a
result of the huge personal commitment by the defendants Steel and Morris,
as well as the efforts of their supporters, the McLibel case illustrates each of
these counter-measures.
Legal attacks can be turned into opportunities for the defence, either in court57
or in the public domain. More generally, the backfire framework points to
those tactics that are most effective for plaintiffs and those that work best for
their opponents. The framework offers some object lessons for those who are
rich and powerful: be careful about suing when the action can be perceived as
excessive and when there is someone who will mount a determined resistance.
Large corporations have already learned from McDonald’s public relations
disaster.
For individuals inclined to sue media organisations for attacks on their
reputations, there is a great risk: the ensuing case can be used to further
damage one’s reputation, sometimes dramatically. This is the lesson from
John Marsden’s suit against Channel Seven: he won the legal case but ended
up with his reputation damaged far more than before. Geoff Clark, who was
seriously defamed in the media, decided not to sue, thus avoiding this risk.
For free speech advocates, the backfire model gives guidance on tactics. A
key message is to take the issues to wider audiences, thereby resisting coverup and intimidation. As well, taking the issue to wider audiences reduces the
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narrowing of the issue to the legal forum, where plaintiffs have the advantage
of legal legitimacy. In the words of one commentator, ‘Once you start
thinking of the case as a legal matter rather than a political issue, you have
started to lose — politically and legally.’58
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